Demand shifts due to salience effects: Experimental evidence by Dertwinkel-Kalt, M. et al.
This is a repository copy of Demand shifts due to salience effects: Experimental evidence.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/136965/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Dertwinkel-Kalt, M., Köhler, K., Lange, M.R.J. et al. (1 more author) (2017) Demand shifts 
due to salience effects: Experimental evidence. Journal of the European Economic 
Association, 15 (3). pp. 626-653. ISSN 1542-4766 
https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvw012
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in 
Journal of the European Economic Association following peer review. The version of 
record Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt, Katrin Köhler, Mirjam R. J. Lange, Tobias Wenzel; Demand
Shifts Due to Salience Effects: Experimental Evidence, Journal of the European Economic 
Association, Volume 15, Issue 3, 1 July 2017, Pages 626–653 is available online at: 
https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvw012
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
Demand Shifts Due to Salience Effects:
Experimental Evidence∗
Markus Dertwinkel-Kalt1,† Katrin Ko¨hler2,‡ Mirjam R.J. Lange2,§
Tobias Wenzel2,3,¶
1University of Cologne
2Du¨sseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), University of Du¨sseldorf
3University of Bath
March 2016
Abstract
We conduct a laboratory experiment that tests two fundamental predic-
tions unique to salience theory. If an agent purchases one of two vertically
differentiated products, salience theory makes the following two distinct
predictions. First, it hypothesizes that a higher expected price level for both
products shifts demand toward the more expensive, high-quality product.
Second, it predicts that demand for the high-quality product is larger if the
price level is expectedly high than if it is unexpectedly high. In our ex-
periment, subjects purchased fast or slow internet access at different price
levels. Our results strongly support both predictions of salience theory.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies consumers’ choices inmarkets with vertical product differen-
tiation. Decisions between goods and services which are differentiated in price
and quality are widespread. For example, in grocery or electronics stores con-
sumers choose between various types of vertically differentiated goods on a fre-
quent basis, e.g., manufacturer’s brands versus home brands or simple cellular
phones versusmultifunctional smart phones. Given its ubiquity, understanding
the underlying evaluation criteria yields important implications for commercial
decisions like the range of products produced and for marketing purposes, as
well as for related fields such as psychology and consumer decision research in
economics (Azar, 2011).
Suppose a consumer has to choose from a set of goods which are character-
ized by the attributes price and quality. Standard theory requires that the con-
sumer evaluates the different options separately and chooses the option which
maximizes her utility. In contrast, salience theory (Bordalo et al., 2013; hence-
forth BGS) predicts context-dependent choices. A consumer’s attention is drawn
either to a good’s price or to a good’s quality, depending on which attribute is
more salient, i.e. differs most from the average level among all options which
come to the consumer’s mind. In this paper we study choices between vertically
differentiated products in a laboratory experiment, thereby providing a first test
of salience theory.
In general, salience theory (Bordalo et al., 2012a,b, 2013) states that agents
overemphasize especially salient features of choices and underrate less promi-
nent, but possibly important aspects. This assumption is supported by psycho-
logical evidence suggesting that an agent’s attention is limited and therefore al-
located to outstanding features (Taylor and Thompson, 1982; Kahneman, 2011).
Regarding decision making under risk, salience theory provides an alternative
rationale for violations of expected utility theory which have previously been
explained by prospect theory (Bordalo et al., 2012b). With respect to riskless de-
cision making, it can explain many violations of rational choice in the domain
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of consumer choice, such as endowment (Bordalo et al., 2012a) or decoy effects
(Bordalo et al., 2013). Thus, salience theory provides a better understanding for
a broad variety of cognitive biases and puzzles via the assumption that agents’
attention is focused on outstanding features.
Formally, salience theory is built on two main assumptions: ordering and
diminishing sensitivity. Ordering states that an attribute is the more salient the
more it differs from the attribute’s average level among all options in a given
choice context. For instance, a good’s price becomes more salient the further
it is away from the average price. Diminishing sensitivity, as a core feature of
human perception in general (Weber’s law) and of prospect theory in particular
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), states that by uniformly increasing the value
of an attribute for all goods, the salience of this attribute is reduced. Thus, for
example, a generally higher price level makes prices less salient.
The following example by BGS illustrates how purchase decisions between
two vertically differentiated products may reverse if the general price level in-
creases. Suppose a consumer intends to buy a red wine at a wine store. She has
the choice between an Australian shiraz for $10 and a French syrah for $20, know-
ing that she likes the French wine better. As prices in the wine store are modest,
the $10 price difference is noticeable. In this context prices are salient, and the
consumer opts for the cheaper Australian wine. A few weeks later she visits
a restaurant where again both wines are on display. As expected, both wines
are marked up by an additional amount of $40, making the price difference of
$10 less prominent (due to diminishing sensitivity). Thus, in the restaurant the
French syrah seems to be a better deal and the consumer decides to buy a bottle
of this wine.
In the preceding example, the consumer’s price expectations coincided with
the actual prices. As expected, the price level was low in the store and high in
the restaurant. Imagine that, in contrast, the consumer expected low prices or
was at least unsure whether the price level would be low or high, but then faced
high prices (we say that prices are unexpectedly high). In such non-deterministic
settings, not just the differences between the available options attract the con-
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sumer’s attention, but also the surprising features of the choice context. Thus,
an attribute’s salience also depends on how much its actual realization differs
from prior expectations, that is, the reference price is not just the average price
of all available options, but it is also affected by the consumer’s expectation of
the price level. If prices are unexpectedly high, the consumer finds prices to
be salient. Therefore, she is less likely to choose a high-quality product than if
prices where expectedly high. This effect is driven by ordering: if a consumer
takes not only high, but also low price levels into consideration, the reference
price is reduced, thereby rendering high prices more salient. Concerning the
example above, a consumer going to a store and being surprised by restaurant
prices is hypothesized not to go for the high-class wine, but for the budget op-
tion. As a consequence, at expectedly high prices Bordalo et al. (2013) predict
that sensitivity to prices is low, while it is higher after unexpected price hikes.
In a laboratory experiment with real consumption decisions, this paper tests
two central anddistinctive predictions of salience theorywith respect to decision
making between vertically differentiated products: (1) a higher expected price
level for both products shifts demand toward the more expensive, high-quality
product and (2) demand for the high-quality product is larger if the price level
is expectedly high than if it is unexpectedly high.
In our experiment, participants had to choose between amore expensive, fast
internet connection (the high-quality product) and a cheaper, slow internet con-
nection (the low-quality product). They were endowed with a lump sum from
which the costs for their purchase were deducted.1 We controlled for partici-
pants’ expectations by sending out an information email a couple of days prior
to the experiment. In this email the experiment was described and the prices of
the two options were announced.
We compare choices in a situation where the actual price level is low (LP-
1There are further studies which implemented real consumption in the laboratory. For in-
stance, internet access has also been used by Pagel and Zeppenfeld (2013) andHouser et al. (2010),
whereas Brown et al. (2009) and Jimura et al. (2009) have incorporated beverage rewards. Sippel
(1997) offered a variety of goods which could be consumed (snacks, juices, different media).
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treatment) with a situation where all prices are marked up by the same amount
(HP-treatment). In both treatments, the announced prices in the information
email were identical to the actual prices faced in the experiment. In order to test
for the role of expectations, we ran an additional treatment in which subjects
were unsure about the price level (UHP-treatment). In this treatment partici-
pants received an information email listing both the prices from the LP- and the
HP-treatment, while they faced the high price level from the HP-treatment in
the experiment.2
Wefind strong support for the predictions of salience theory. First, we detect
that in the HP-treatment the share of subjects opting for the premium product
is significantly larger than in the LP-treatment. Second, there is a significant
difference between choices in an environment with an expectedly and an unex-
pectedly high price level, pointing to the importance of controlling for expecta-
tions. In particular, we find that when faced with unexpectedly high prices in
the UHP-treatment, subjects are less likely to choose the high-quality product
than in the HP-treatment.
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. We test for the fun-
damentals of salience theory in a controlled and incentivized laboratory exper-
iment with real consumption decisions. We focus on two aspects: the effect of
increasing the price level and the effect of price surprises on choices. This has
two appeals. First, the predictions regarding our treatments differ widely across
recent behavioral papers and thus allow us to assess the validity of various ap-
proaches. While several theories can explain atmost one finding, salience theory
as outlined in BGS is, at least to our knowledge, the only theory that is in accor-
dance with our twomain findings in one coherent framework. We elaborate this
further in Section 5. Second, those treatments are novel additions to the litera-
2Ideally, a test for the role of expectations would include a treatment in which subjects hold
wrong expectations such that they do not expect to find the factual priceswith any positive proba-
bility. We abstain from such a treatment in order to avoid deceiving subjects. Instead of providing
erroneous information ex ante, we provided a list of feasible prices, thereby expanding the set of
prices the subjects consider to be possible.
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ture. As far as we know there has been no experiment that studies the effects
of price surprises on choices. Other predictions by salience theory (such as de-
coy and compromise effects), on the contrary, have been studied and supported
extensively in the literature (Highhouse, 1996; Herne, 1999).
Up to now, there are only a few studies which have empirically tested novel
predictions by salience theory. In a laboratory experiment, Dertwinkel-Kalt and
Ko¨hler (2016) test for the reverse endowment effect for bads as predicted in Bor-
dalo et al. (2012a). More directly related to our setup, Azar (2010) conducts a field
experiment where differentiated versions of bagels (with and without cream
cheese) are sold to students. Testing a model of relative thinking (Azar, 2007),
the author implements two treatments with different price levels, but does not
find a significant shift in demand. While Azar (2010) does not control for price
expectations, we show that demand shifts from low- to high-quality goods oc-
cur only if consumers are not surprised by unexpectedly high prices. Hastings
and Shapiro (2013) investigate the effect of unexpected price shifts on consumer
choices in the market for gasoline. In line with salience theory, they find that an
unexpected uniformprice increase induces agents to shift toward cheaper, lower
octane gasoline. Unlike our study, however, Hastings and Shapiro (2013) need
to impose strong assumptions on the prices agents have on their mind when
making a purchase decision.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
salience theory and itsmain predictions regarding our setup. Section 3 describes
the experimental design and derives the hypotheses before we present our re-
sults in Section 4. In Section 5 we review alternative theories and relate them to
our experimental findings. We explain how our study contributes to the litera-
ture in Section 6 and, finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
We outline salience theory as presented in BGS. Carefully delineating the role
of expectations for the predictions made by salience theory, we illustrate that
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salience effects can induce different choices in a high-price compared to a low-
price setting. The main ingredient of the model is that decision makers do not
evaluate options according to true consumption utilities, but overweight the
salient attribute of an option.
A decisionmaker chooses from a finite choice set C = {(qk, pk) ∈ R
2
+|1 ≤ k ≤
N} of N > 1 vertically differentiated products, where each good k := (qk, pk)
is described by its quality level qk and its price pk. In the absence of salience
effects, a consumer values good k with a linear utility function which assigns
equal weights to its two attributes,
u(k) = qk − pk. (1)
If an agent’s decision making is affected by salience, she does not maximize
Equation (1) but overweights the attribute which is more salient. Salience is
assessed via a salience function σ : R2 → R+ which is symmetric and continuous
and has the following two key properties: It obeys ordering, that is, σ(x+µǫ, y−
µǫ′) > σ(x, y) for µ = sgn(x − y) and ǫ, ǫ′ ≥ 0 with ǫ + ǫ′ > 0, and it exhibits
diminishing sensitivity, that is, σ(x+ ǫ, y+ ǫ) < σ(x, y) for all ǫ > 0. For a salience
function σ and a choice set C, a product k’s price is more salient the larger the
value σ(pk, p) is, with p :=
∑
k pk/N . Analogously, k’s quality is themore salient
the larger σ(qk, q) is, with q :=
∑
k qk/N . We say that product k’s price is salient
if σ(pk, p) > σ(qk, q) holds, its quality is salient if σ(pk, p) < σ(qk, q) and both
are equally salient if σ(pk, p) = σ(qk, q).
The outlined properties of the salience function capture two essential fea-
tures of sensory perception (Bordalo et al., 2012b). First, according to ordering,
a product’s price (quality) is the more salient the more it stands out, put differ-
ently, the more it differs from the average price p (the average quality q) in C.
Second, diminishing sensitivity implies that the saliency of a good’s attribute
decreases if the value of that attribute uniformly increases for all items in C (We-
ber’s lawof sensory perception). For instance, a good’s price becomes less salient
if all prices are increased by a uniform amount.
An agent’s susceptibility to salience is captured by the parameter δ ∈ [0, 1]
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that denotes to which extent the relative weights on the attributes are distorted.
Formally, when making her decision, the agent places the multiplicative weight
2/(1+ δ) ≥ 1 on the more salient and 2δ/(1+ δ) ≤ 1 on the less salient attribute.
The smaller δ is the more the decision weights are distorted in favor of a prod-
uct’s salient attribute. The limit case of a rational consumer who maximizes (1)
is characterized by δ = 1. In the following we assume that the agent is suscep-
tible to the salience bias, thus δ < 1. We denote her corresponding distorted
utility function with us(·).
To investigate how changes in the price level can induce choice reversals,
we show that a higher price levels affect the way a consumer values a product.
Suppose that for product k the price is salient, that is, σ(qk, q) < σ(pk, p), such
that
us(k) =
2δ
1 + δ
qk −
2
1 + δ
pk. (2)
Now assume that all prices are uniformly shifted upward by an amount
∆ > 0, such that the average price equals p + ∆. Due to diminishing sensi-
tivity, product k’s price becomes less salient the larger the price shift ∆ is. For
a sufficiently large∆, the product’s quality may eventually become salient such
that σ(qk, q) > σ(pk + ∆, p + ∆) holds. In this case, the uniform price shift ∆
makes k’s quality salient and the decision maker evaluates the product as
us(k∆) =
2
1 + δ
qk −
2δ
1 + δ
(pk +∆), (3)
where k∆ := (qk, pk +∆) denotes good k at the increased price level.
Expected price shifts. Suppose there are two vertically differentiated products
k ∈ {1, 2} with q1 < q2 and p1 < p2. Presuming that these two products lie on
a rational indifference curve with qk − pk = c > 0 for k ∈ {1, 2},
3 the price is
3We adopt the assumption by BGS that the goods lie on a rational indifference curve merely
for illustrative purposes. Whenever the salience distortion outweighs the objective gap between
the products, a price shift can reverse choices. Thus, the following predictions still hold if the
agent strictly prefers one of the products.
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salient for both goods as
σ(qk, q) = σ(pk + c, p+ c) < σ(pk, p)
holds, such that the low-quality good is chosen.4 There exists a thresholdmarkup
∆∗ > 0 at which prices and quality are equally salient. For any ∆ < ∆∗,
the price remains salient for both products such that the low-quality product
is chosen, while for any ∆ > ∆∗ quality is overweighted and the consumer
chooses the high-quality product. In particular, we have ∆∗ = c. Provided that
σ(pk, p) > σ(qk, q) and σ(pk +∆, p+∆) < σ(qk, q), salience theory hypothesizes
that a uniform price increase ∆ shifts demand toward the high-quality good.
Thus, an agent’s price sensitivity crucially depends on the price level.
Prediction 1. Suppose there are two vertically differentiated products and the low-
quality product is sold at a lower price. If the general price level is sufficiently low,
the agent chooses the low-quality product. If the general price level is sufficiently high,
the agent chooses the high-quality product.
Due to diminishing sensitivity fixed price differences loom the smaller the
larger the general price level is. Therefore, subjects are more willing to pay a
fixed price difference in order to obtain the better quality at a high than at a low
price level.
Unexpected price shifts. In the previous analysis, the agent compares a prod-
uct against those alternatives which are indeed available. If, however, she ex-
pects to find alternatives which are not available when she makes her consump-
tion decision, she may evaluate each option not only within her actual choice
set, C, but within the set comprising the actual and expected offers. We call this
comprehensive set the agent’s consideration setC. For instance, if she expects sev-
eral price levels to be feasible, then her consideration set consists of the products
at their actual and at their expected price level.
4We ensure that the decision maker chooses one alternative by assuming that she receives a
utility of −∞ if she does not consume.
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Consider again the two vertically differentiated products (q1, p1) and (q2, p2)
with q1 < q2 and p1 < p2 and scrutinize the following three scenarios. First, the
general price level is low and consumers expected it to be low, that is, for each
consumer the consideration set equals the choice set (scenario LP). We denote
this as CLP := CLP = {(q1, p1), (q2, p2)}. Second, the general price level is high
and consumers expected it to be high (scenario HP) such that CHP := CHP =
{(q1, p1+∆), (q2, p2+∆)} holds for some∆ > 0. Third, suppose that consumers
expected both price levels to be feasible (scenario UHP). Denote the (exogenous)
probability with which the agent expects the low price level pL ∈ [0, 1]. Then,
the low-quality product’s expected price equals
pe1 := pL p1 + (1− pL)(p1 +∆)
and the high-quality product’s expected price is given by
pe2 := pL p2 + (1− pL)(p2 +∆).
Denote Ce := {(q1, p
e
1), (q2, p
e
2)}. Thus, an agent’s consideration set is given by
CUHP := CHP ∪ Ce = {(q1, p1 +∆), (q2, p2 +∆), (q1, p
e
1), (q2, p
e
2)}.
Within CUHP , the average price is (weakly) lower than within CHP , causing the
high-quality product’s price to be more salient within CUHP than within CHP .
In particular, if the price of the high-quality product is salient in UHP while its
quality is salient in HP, then the agent’s valuation of this product is lower in
UHP than in HP. This yields the prediction that consumers are less inclined to
choose the high-quality product if the price level is unexpectedly high than if it
is expectedly high.
Formally, the average price within CUHP equals p + (1 − pL/2)∆ with p =
(p1 + p2)/2. Therefore, salience of the high-quality product’s price in UHP is
given by σ(p2 +∆, p+ (1− pL/2)∆)while in HP it is given by σ(p2 +∆, p+∆).
According to the ordering property, the high price is more salient in UHP than
in HP for all ∆ > 0 as long as pL > 0. Thus, suppose that in HP the high-
quality product’s quality is salient while in UHP its price is salient. Then the
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high-quality product is valued as
us(k∆, CUHP ) =
2δ
1 + δ
qk −
2
1 + δ
(pk +∆)
< us(k∆, CHP ) =
2
1 + δ
qk −
2δ
1 + δ
(pk +∆).
Prediction 2. Suppose agents have to choose between two vertically differentiated prod-
ucts (where the low-quality product has a lower price). Consider two scenarios. First,
subjects expect high prices and are faced with coinciding high prices. Second, subjects
are unsure whether the price level is high or low, but finally face high prices. In the second
scenario, fewer subjects choose the high-quality product than in the first scenario.
High prices attract more attention if they are partly surprising than if they
were entirely expected. That is, having low prices on one’s mind renders high
prices more salient. As a result, people are less willing to pay a fixed price dif-
ference for the better quality if prices are surprisingly high than if they are not.
Note that these two predictions precisely allow to test the key assumptions of
salience theory. The first prediction represents a test of diminishing sensitivity.
The second tests jointly (a) the assumption that the consideration set (instead of
the actual choice set) affects decision making and (b) the ordering property.
3 Experimental setup
3.1 Experimental design
We invited students to a laboratory experiment where they had to purchase ei-
ther a fast or a slow internet connection; an outside optionwas not available (that
is, participants could not opt for not using the internet at all). Internet connec-
tions were differentiated with respect to quality, given by potential download
speeds: While it took around 30 seconds to fully load frequently used websites,
such as Facebook or a newspaper site when using the slow internet connection,
it only took around five seconds with the fast connection. Participants did not
have to complete any tasks but could use the internet at their convenience for
the duration of the experiment. Students received a lump sum payment for par-
ticipating, however, they had to incur a cost for using the internet.
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Procedures
First, students received a standard invitation email to our experiment viaORSEE
(Greiner, 2004) and registered online. Deviating from the standard procedure,
participants received an additional information email a few days prior to the ex-
periment. This email corresponded largely to the instructions, which were later
distributed during the experiment. In particular, the available speeds, the corre-
sponding prices of the two internet connections and the lump sum payment for
participationwere announced. This information email was used to influence the
participants’ expectations of the price level for internet access. We outline below
how the information email and the instructions differed between the treatments
and discuss how it might affect attrition in Section 4.3.5
After arriving at the laboratory, participants were randomly assigned to a
separatedworking station equippedwith a computer. All screenswere switched
off at this point. Subjects received the instructions which the experimenter then
read aloud. Participantswere informed that they had to purchase internet access
which they could use at their convenience for 45 minutes. It was not allowed
to use any brought items, e.g., smartphones, books or papers. Speakers were
not in place and illegal downloads were prohibited during the experiment. The
instructions emphasized that the experimenters could not trackwhich pages the
subjects browsed during the experiment.
After reading the instructions aloud and answering potential questions in
private, subjects received a decision sheet and indicated their choice of either
slow or fast internet. Thereafter, computers were set up according to subjects’
purchase decisions. After 45minutes the screens shut down automatically and a
final questionnaire was issued to all participants. Finally, subjects received their
payment privately.
5Appendix A contains an English translation of the information emails and the instructions.
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Table 1: Overview of the different treatments.
Treatment Description Endowment Prices Expected Consideration
Fast Slow prices set
LP low prices 12 1.50 0.50 Yes CLP
HP high prices 15 4.50 3.50 Yes CHP
UHP unexpected prices 15 4.50 3.50 No CHP ∪ Ce
All prices in Euros.
Treatments and hypotheses
Within this settingwe ran three different treatments andused a between-subjects
approach to test the hypotheses proposed by salience theory. Table 1 gives an
overview of the treatments which we explain below.
The first goal of the experiment was to study the effect of an expectedly
higher price level on the consumption choices by implementing a low-price (LP)
and a high-price (HP) treatment. In the low-price treatment subjects received a
fixed endowment of e12, with prices equal to e0.50 for the slow internet and
e1.50 for the fast internet connection. In the high-price treatment, we increased
the general price level by e3, the prices for slow and fast internet access cor-
responded to e3.50 and e4.50, respectively. To rule out any income effects the
endowment was adjusted likewise and amounted to e15.
In both treatments, LP and HP, all information contained in the preceding
email (in particular, the listed prices) corresponded to those from the instruc-
tions distributed during the experiment. Thus, a subject in treatment LP (HP)
considers only the two options at their actual prices, such that her considera-
tion set equals CLP (CHP ). This allows us to test for quality choices when low
and high price levels are expected. From Prediction 1 we derive the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. In treatment HP a larger share of subjects opt for the fast internet con-
nection than in treatment LP.
The study’s second objective was to analyze how choices are affected if par-
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ticipants’ price expectations are not fullymet. We therefore ran a third treatment
in which participants were unsure whether the price level would be high or low
(UHP). In the UHP-treatment, subjects received an information email prior to
the experiment, stating that the prices for both internet connections will be ei-
there0.50 for slow ande1.50 for fast internet (corresponding to prices in the LP-
treatment) or e3.50 for slow and e4.50 for fast internet access (corresponding to
the prices from the HP-treatment) while the lump sum payment corresponded
to that of treatment HP (e15). The actual prices in the experiment were equal to
those in the HP-treatment.
With this procedure participants were unsure about the prices they would
face in the experiment. The idea is that, whenmaking the purchase decision, the
subjects have actual and expected prices on their mind. We interpret this treat-
ment as capturing the effects of unexpectedly high price levels. Thus, a subject’s
consideration set in treatment UHP is given by CHP ∪Ce.6 From Prediction 2 the
following hypothesis follows:
Hypothesis 2. In treatment UHP a smaller share of subjects opt for the fast internet
connection than in treatment HP.7
Participants
Sessions were conducted between January and June 2015 at the DICE exper-
imental laboratory at the Heinrich-Heine University Du¨sseldorf. In total, 169
subjects participated, 59 in the HP, 57 in the LP, and 53 in the UHP treatment.
Each treatment comprised five sessions, thus adding up to 15 sessions for the
6We stay agnostic about the exact probability with which the low price level is expected. As
we mention the low price level in the information email, however, we assume that most subjects
expect the low price level to occur with some probability.
7In this stylized rank-based salience model according to which an attribute is either salient or
not, choices in UHP and LP should be identical if the price is salient in both treatments. This,
however, is an artefact of the rank-based model. Choices in LP and UHP are not predicted to be
identical in a richermodel with a smooth salience specification according towhichweights do not
just reflect which attribute is more salient, but also how salient an attribute in fact is. A smooth
specification is, for instance, proposed in footnote 9 of Bordalo et al. (2012b).
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three treatments. A session lasted around 60 minutes and subjects earned ei-
ther e10.50 or e11.50.
3.2 Discussion of the experimental design
We now discuss the main features of the design and how they match the as-
sumptions made by salience theory. Furthermore, we outline the advantages of
a laboratory experiment compared to a field study.
First, the consumption alternatives in our experiment are clearly vertically
differentiated. A fast internet connection is doubtlessly superior to a slow one
and, at equal prices, one would expect all subjects to opt for the fast connec-
tion. Therefore, we can exactly mirror the assumption made in BGS according
to which goods are two-dimensional and uniquely defined by their quality- and
price-parameters. Another advantage of our implementation is that subjects in
our experiment have a clear demand for the products as they are not allowed to
use any devices or items during the 45-minute duration of the experiment.
Second, high-price and low-price environments typically attract different
classes of consumers. For instance, consumers who buy wines at high-class
restaurants and those who buy wines at cheap stores can be expected to be het-
erogeneous with respect to income and the appreciation of quality. We can ex-
clude such sample biases by randomly assigning subjects to treatments.
Third and most importantly, the design of our experiment allows us to an-
alyze the role of consideration sets and expectations. To the best of our knowl-
edge, we are the first to investigate the subtle difference between expected and
unexpected price shifts which plays an important role for consumer choice in
salience theory. In the study by Hastings and Shapiro (2013), for example, the
empirical results crucially depend on the definition of the consideration sets.
In their two specifications, the consideration sets consisted of all price-quality-
combinationswhichwere available either during the last week or during the last
four weeks. Their results are sensitive to this specification. In our LP- and HP-
treatments the consideration sets are explicitly given by the choice sets while in
treatment UHP the consideration set is larger as it comprises also the options at
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their expected prices. Thereby, we can properly control for the consideration set
which is a novelty in the empirical literature.
Fourth, by adjusting the endowments between treatments LP and HP, we
keep the subjects’ income level constant in real terms such that the choices in
terms of real payoffs are identical in all three treatments: subjects could either
get the high-speed internet and e10.50 or the low-speed internet and e11.50.
That is, the differences between the choices that we observe can be attributed to
the different frames used in the treatments. Here we have standard economic
theory as the clear benchmark, which we could test against, as it cannot explain
any shift of demand between the treatments. If endowments stay the same (such
that income differs in real terms between the treatments), we would not expect
the same choice patterns. Due to income effects, we would expect fewer choices
for the fast internet with a low price level and an endowment of 12 Euro than
with a low price level and endowment 15. As a consequence, when comparing
HP and LPwith identical endowments (say 15) this would contain both salience
effects and income effects. We therefore view the adjustment of endowments as
the appropriate approach to detect salience effects when comparing HP and LP.
Fifth and finally, we are able to fix the consumption location in our study.
Both the high- and the low-quality product yield the same utility in all treat-
ments, while in general high-quality products may provide a higher utility at
high-class, pricy locations. Our study eliminates this as an explanation for de-
mand shifts.
4 Results
This section presents the experimental results which are summarized in Table
2. We start by investigating the effects of an expectedly high price level and
compare the treatments LP and HP (Hypothesis 1). Subsequently, we examine
the impact of an unexpectedly high price level (or, more precisely, of a high price
level when low prices are considered) by comparing HP and UHP (Hypothesis
2). Robustness checks are provided at the end of this section.
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Table 2: Experimental results
LP treatment HP treatment UHP treatment
Choice Choice Choice
Fast 16 28.1% 27 45.8% 14 26.4%
Slow 41 71.9% 32 54.2% 39 73.6%
# of participants 57 59 53
4.1 Results for an expectedly high price level
We find that in treatment HP the share of subjects opting for the more expensive
internet connection is significantly higher than in treatment LP. As can be seen
in Table 2, in treatment LP 28.1% (16 out of 57 subjects) choose the fast internet
connectionwhile in treatment HP this share increases to 45.8% (27 out of 59 sub-
jects). This effect is quite sizeable: In our setting, a e3 markup on both prices
significantly raises the share of the high-quality product by roughly 20 percent-
age points. With a p-value of 0.025 (one-sided χ2-test), we can reject the null
hypothesis that an expectedly higher price level (weakly) decreases the share of
subjects choosing the high-quality product. This is in line with Hypothesis 1:
Result 1. With an expectedly higher price level, a larger share of subjects opt for the
high-quality, more expensive internet connection.
4.2 Results for an unexpectedly high price level
We now contrast the effects of an expectedly and an unexpectedly high price
level by comparing the outcomes in the treatments HP and UHP. In compliance
with Hypothesis 2, a smaller share of subjects should opt for the fast internet in
treatment UHP than in treatment HP. Indeed, our results suggest that subjects’
choices depend on their initial expectations of the price level. In treatment HP
45.8% of the subjects (27 out of 59) opt for the fast internet connection, while in
treatment UHP only 26.4% of the subjects (14 out of 53) choose the fast inter-
net connection. In treatment UHP a significantly lower share of subjects favors
the fast internet connection than in treatment HP (p = 0.017, one-sided χ2-test).
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Hence, the null hypothesis that, compared to an expectedly high price level, an
unexpectedly high price level (weakly) increases the share of subjects opting for
the high-quality product can be rejected. Thus, our result accords with Hypoth-
esis 2:
Result 2. Compared to an expectedly high price level, a lower share of subjects opt for
the fast internet connection when facing an unexpectedly high price level.
Our results suggest that expectedly and unexpectedly high price levels affect
choices differently. An expectedly higher price level tends to increase the share
of subjects choosing the high-quality, high-price product, while an unexpectedly
higher price level does not. Both findings are in line with the predictions made
by BGS.
4.3 Robustness
In this subsection we assess the robustness of our results. First, we apply a mul-
tivariate logit regression model to control for subject characteristics. Second, we
analyze whether attrition might impact our results.
Logit estimation is conducted given the binary dependent variable, which
equals one if a subject chose the fast internet connection and zero otherwise.8
The regression analysis allows to control for personal characteristics that might
influence subjects’ decisions. The included controls are gender andfield of study.9
Table B1 (Appendix B) provides summary statistics of all variables. Estimation
results for an expectedly and an unexpectedly high price level are presented in
Table 3.
Specifications (1) and (2) use the choice data from the treatments LP and HP
to estimate the effect of an expected uniformly higher price level. Specification
8Applying OLS yields similar results. However, due to the discrete dependent variable logit
is preferred to OLS.
9Although we have further information on age and the degree pursued (bachelor vs. master),
we abstained from including them as the qualitative results do not change, but sample size is
reduced due to missing observations.
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Table 3: Logit regression of opting for the fast internet connection.
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4)
High Price 0.771*** 0.730** 0.771*** 0.728**
(0.326) (0.401) (0.320) (0.358)
Unexpected - - -0.855*** -0.782***
(0.260) (0.279)
Controls no yes no yes
Observations 116 111 169 163
All specifications include a constant.
Robust standard errors at the session level in parenthesis.
One-sided significance level: *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%.
(1) solely includes the dummy variableHigh Price, which is equal to one if a sub-
ject is part of the treatment group with an increased price level (HP treatment).
High Price is positive and highly significant. Switching from LP to HP results
in a 0.77 unit change in the log of the odds for choosing the fast internet. Put
differently, the odds of choosing the fast internet connection are 2.2 times (120%)
larger in the HP than in the LP treatment. When controlling for personal charac-
teristics, as in specification (2), the effect is marginally reduced. Being part of the
HP treatment increases the log of the odds of choosing the fast internet connec-
tion by 0.73 or rather the odds are 108% higher in the HP than in LP treatment.
Both results are in line with Result 1.
To determine the difference between an expectedly and an unexpectedly
highprice level, we include the variableUnexpected. Unexpected indicateswhether
the information email announced both price levels (Unexpected=1) or the factual
prices only (Unexpected=0). Columns (3) and (4) report the estimation results,
using data from all three treatments. Again, we estimate amodel with andwith-
out additional controls.10 In both specifications the coefficients ofUnexpected are
negative at a high significance level. Taking part in UHP instead of HP, leads to
10Note that none of the included controls is significant in both regressions (2) and (4) and the
effect of themain treatment variables (High Price andUnexpected) does not depend on the selection
of controls.
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a -0.86 (-0.78) unit change in the log of the odds of choosing fast internet. Al-
ternatively, the odds in UHP are 58% (54%) lower than the odds in HP.11 These
findings are consistent with Result 2.
Induced by the non-standard invitation procedurewith the upfront informa-
tion email, attrition might be an issue, i.e., the non-random dropout of invited
subjects across treatments. Indeed, show-up rates slightly vary: 84% in LP, 88%
in HP and 77% in UHP. However, several pieces of evidence suggest that there is
no selection bias. First, the documented show-up rates are comparable to those
of other experiments conducted in the same lab (roughly 85%). Second, there is
no selection on observables as subject characteristics are balanced across treat-
ments (see Table B1). Third, and in contrast to the recent literature which deals
with attrition and selection on unobservables (Behaghel et al., 2009; Jones and
Mahajan, 2015), potential explanations why attrition might not be orthogonal
to our treatment assignment oppose the effect we observe, that is, higher attri-
tion in UHP. In particular, the earnings in UHP weakly dominate those in LP
and HP, suggesting a lower dropout rate in UHP. Expected earnings are even
strictly higher for any choice if the subject assigns a positive probability to the
low-price scenario. Thus, besides a random effect there seems to be no plausible
explanation (e.g., risk aversion) for the slightly lower show-up rate in UHP.
Nevertheless, selection on unobservables cannot be ruled out entirely. Fol-
lowingBehaghel et al. (2009) and Jones andMahajan (2015), we impose themono-
tonicity assumption to derive a lower bound on the magnitude of the demand
shift. Monotonicity assumes that all subjects showing up in the treatment with
the higher attrition rate (UHP) would have also shown up in the treatment with
the lower attrition rate (HP). We are interested in the counterfactual decision of
the 59 HP-subjects if they had participated in UHP. Denote Cz an indicator vari-
able which is one if and only if a subject showed up in treatment z ∈ {HP, UHP}.
Incorporating the method by Jones and Mahajan (2015, Appendix C.2), we ob-
tainE(YHP−YUHP|CHP = 1) = 0.128 > 0, where Yz = 1 if the subject chooses fast
11When estimating the model only with data on HP and UHP, results are confirmed.
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internet in treatment z and zero otherwise. Thus, the demand shift persists even
if we consider this lower bound. Alternatively, we could investigate a worst-case
scenario in the spirit of Lee (2009) by aligning the sample sizes. According to the
monotonicity assumption, it suffices to enlarge the UHP-sample by six observa-
tions working against our effect. Even in this worst-case scenario, the difference
between HP and UHP is significant at the 10% level (p=0.094, one-sided χ2-test).
Thus, Result 2 still holds under very conservative assumptions.
5 Discussion of alternative theories
Standard economic theory cannot account for the different choice patterns that
we observe. As the feasible outcomes are identical in all three treatments, i.e.,
receiving e10.50 and the high-quality internet or e11.50 and the low-quality
internet, standard economic theory does not predict a demand shift. Hence,
neither Result 1 nor Result 2 can be explained.
Other behavioral models, such as Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Ko˝szegi
and Rabin (2006), Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2013), Bushong et al. (2015), Azar (2007)
and Cunningham (2013), can explain parts of our findings, but no model is con-
sistent with both results. Thus, no other model (apart from BGS) can account
for Result 1 and Result 2 in one coherent framework.
Prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Prospect theory hypothe-
sizes that subjects evaluate outcomes with respect to a deterministic, exogenous
reference point which typically indicates an agent’s status quo. With respect to
this reference point, an agent’s value function satisfies the properties of dimin-
ishing sensitivity and loss aversion, that is, losses are weighted disproportion-
ally compared to gains. In our experiment, the reference point is represented
by a two-dimensional vector (r1, r2), where r1 gives the reference earning and
r2 gives the reference quality of the internet connection. As university students
typically have access to high speed internet for free (in particular, those living
on campus), a sensible reference point is where r1 equals the announced endow-
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ment (e12 in LP and e15 in HP) and r2 equals the high quality qH .
Given this reference point, prospect theory can explain Result 1 via dimin-
ishing sensitivity: the price difference in LP (1.50 vs. 0.50) feels larger than the
same price difference in HP (4.50 vs. 3.50). Hence, choosing the high-quality
product is more attractive in HP than in LP. In particular, a decision maker opt-
ing for the high-quality product in LP will also opt for it in HP, therefore the
share of subjects opting for the high-quality product is larger in HP than in LP.
Prospect theory, however, does not predict different decisions for treatments
HP and UHP as the subject’s status quo and therefore the reference point is not
affected by the information email. In a nutshell, prospect theory can explain
Result 1, but not Result 2.
Personal equilibrium (Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2006). Ko˝szegi and Rabin (hence-
forth: KR) propose a reference-dependent model where an agent is loss averse
with respect to an endogenous reference point which is shaped by rational ex-
pectations. According to their equilibrium concept of a personal equilibrium (PE)
expectations are consistent with actual behavior. A preferred personal equilibrium
selects a PE with the highest expected utility. In deterministic environments,
KR prescribe choices whichmaximize consumption utility (see their Section III).
As both options yield exactly the same outcomes in the treatments HP and LP
(quality qH and an income of e10.50 or quality qL and an income of e11.50), the
demand shift between LP and HP cannot be explained by KR.12
In order to apply the concept of a personal equilibrium to treatment UHP,
each subject has to assign well-defined probabilities to the different price levels.
Given that the probability with which the low price level is expected is suffi-
ciently high, KR can explain why few people choose the high-quality option in
UHP. The reason is that a subject will rationally expect to go for the low-quality
12For illustration, assume that both goods lie on a rational indifference curve. In a preferred
personal equilibrium the agent will expect to choose one of the options with certainty and behave
consistently at the second stage. Therefore, in LP and HP two preferred personal equilibria exist
and Result 1 remains unexplained.
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in order to minimize her loss in the price-dimension. Hence, KR can be consis-
tent with Result 2. In Appendix C, we provide a formal analysis for this predic-
tion. If, however, subjects inUHPhave nowell-defined expectations, but are am-
biguous about the occurring price level, KR cannot be applied to treatment UHP
as KR require subjects to have clear price expectations. In addition, if the high
price level is expected to be distinctly more likely than the low price level, there
exist further (preferred) personal equilibria (i.e., one in which subjects choose
the high-quality option with probability one, and one in which subjects strictly
mix) such that any choice pattern is in line with KR.
Focusing theory (Ko˝szegi and Szeidl, 2013) and relative thinking (Bushong
et al., 2015).
Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (henceforth: KS) and Bushong et al. (henceforth: BRS) offer
two closely related approaches. KS assume that a decision maker overempha-
sizes those attributes for which the range of choice in choice set C is broad, that
is, for which her options differ a lot, while she tends to neglect attributes for
which the available options are rather similar. In contrast, BRS assume the op-
posite: a decision maker puts more weight on dimensions where the range of
choice is small. More precisely, according to both approaches, an agent values
an option k = (qk, pk) as
u(k) = wq uq(qk) − wp up(pk), (4)
where for x ∈ {p, q} function ux(·) gives a subject’s consumption utility in di-
mension x while weight wx is a function of the available range in dimension x,
that is, wq = w(∆q) with ∆q := maxk∈C uq(qk)−mink∈C uq(qk) and wp = w(∆p)
with ∆p := maxk∈C up(pk) − mink∈C up(pk). Crucially, KS assume that w
′
x > 0,
while BRS propose that w′x < 0 for x ∈ {p, q}.
With utilities linear in price and quality, the price ranges are identical in treat-
ments LP and HP, ∆q = ∆p = 4.50− 3.50 = 1.50− 0.50, such that both models
cannot account for Result 1.
Regarding the predictions of treatment UHP it is essential to consider how
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announced, but not available options affect an individual’s consideration set and
therefore the weights wx. KS mention such effects, but do not offer a systematic
approach how to incorporate them into their setup. BRS, in contrast, consider
several approaches. In the following we discuss their preferred one (see Section
4 of their paper), according to which a subject chooses an option before she is
certain about its price (that is, for instance, after she has read the information
email, but before the actual experiment).13 Formally, she chooses between lot-
teries onRK , that is, her choice set is some F ⊂ ∆(RK). Following BRS the range
along dimension p can be defined by
∆p(F) = max
F∈F
(EF [up(pk)]+
1
2
SF [up(pk)])−min
F∈F
(EF [up(pk)]−
1
2
SF [up(pk)]), (5)
where EF [up(pk)] =
∫
up(pk)dF (p) denotes the decision maker’s expectation of
up(pk) under F , and SF [up(pk)] =
∫ ∫
|up(p
′
k)− up(pk)|dF (p
′)dF (p) the average
distance between two independent draws from the distribution. Let 0 < pL ≤
1 be the probability with which the low price level is expected and (1 − pL)
the probability of expecting the high price level. Straightforward computations
show that the range of the price dimension in UHP equals∆UHPp = 1+6pL(1−
pL), which always exceeds the range in HP, that is,∆
HP
p = 1. Thus, BRS predict
that prices attract more attention in HP than in UHP such that subjects should
be more likely to opt for the high quality in UHP. This contradicts our findings.
To sum up, both KS and BRS cannot account for our results in their original
setups.14 In particular, we can rule out that our findings are driven by relative
thinking as proposed in BRS.
Relative thinking (Azar, 2007). Azar’s model of relative thinking hypothe-
sizes that both the absolute and the relative price differences matter for prod-
13In our experiment, around 80% of the subjects indicated that they have indeed made their
decision immediately after reading the information email.
14Note, however, that focusing theory can account for both results if the following two assump-
tions are added to the model by Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2013): first, the utility function satisfies
diminishing sensitivity, and second, mentally but not factually available items are admitted to
the agent’s choice set.
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uct choices. Given vertically differentiated products, consumers are predicted
to choose the higher quality product with uniformly higher prices as the relative
price increase is lower for the high-quality product. Therefore, relative thinking
explains Result 1.15 As the predictions are independent of the decision maker’s
expectations, Azar cannot account for the difference between expected and un-
expected price increases (Result 2).
Models closely related to Azar (2007), such as Alchian and Allen (1964) and
Barzel (1976), predict a higher relative demand for high-quality products in
high-price than in low-price environments. This prediction stems from the fact
that the price of the premium product relative to the low-quality product is re-
duced by the existence of fixed costs, such as transportation costs (Alchian and
Allen) or unit taxes (Barzel). Taking into account relative prices, demand shifts
toward higher-quality products after a price increase. Several empirical papers
aimed at testing this hypothesis, with generally mixed results.16 However, in
contrast to BGS and the present investigation, none of these papers accounts for
the composition of the consideration set such that they cannot explain Result 2.
Comparisons and choice (Cunningham, 2013). Cunningham offers a behav-
ioral theory according to which preferences depend on the current choice set
and on the choice set history. His main assumption is that the appreciation for
a certain choice dimension (more precisely, the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween this and every other dimension) decreases if any element in the history
(or the current choice set) increases in absolute value along this dimension.
Concerning our experiment, this theory is consistent with Result 1. As both
prices in HP are larger in absolute value, the price dimension attracts less at-
tention than in LP such that subjects are more likely to choose the high quality
15Azar (2010) tests this hypothesis both in a field experiment and in a hypothetical study. While
the hypothetical study supports his prediction (see also Azar, 2011), the field results reject it.
16Bertonazzi et al. (1983), Borcherding and Silberberg (1978), Nesbit (2007), and Sobel and Gar-
ret (1997) find evidence of a demand shift, whereas Coats et al. (2005) and Lawson and Raymer
(2006) find no or only moderate support.
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product in HP than in LP. Cunningham, however, does not offer an unambigu-
ous way of how to include the information email into the framework. In our
interpretation of the model the content of the information email is not part of
the choice set history and therefore Result 2 is not explained.17 Thus, Cunning-
ham can account for our first, but not for our second result.
6 Discussion
Our experiment and, in particular, our first two treatments HP and LP, are in the
spirit of the jacket and calculator puzzle by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) and
Thaler (1999). According to this puzzle, people are willing to drive across town
to save $5 on a $15 calculator while they are not willing to drive across town to
save $5 on a $125 jacket. Thus, people seem to value saving a fixed amount the
less the higher the base price is ($10 vs. $120).
In contrast to other studies, we exclude the outside option of not buying at
all, which allows us to precisely distinguish between relative thinking and dimin-
ishing sensitivity. Bushong et al. (2015)’s model of relative thinking, for instance,
can explain the puzzle only if not buying is an available option. Then, the cost
saving seems large if the base price is low as it represents a larger percentage of
the overall price range. On the contrary, if the base price is high, the cost sav-
ing represents only a small percentage of the overall price range, such that the
saving opportunity seems less attractive. By excluding the outside option of not
17It should be noted that if one is willing to assume that (i) the content of the information email
forms part of the choice set history and (ii) the choice history affects decisions only through the
average values observed in the entire history, then Result 2 is also consistent with his theory as the
average price is larger in HP than in UHP. Thus, price attracts less attention in HP than in UHP
and consequently subjects are more likely to choose the high quality in HP. However, this logic
would also imply that individuals are less likely to choose the high-quality product in LP than
in UHP as the average price is lower in LP. But this prediction is not consistent with our results
as we do not observe significantly different choices between LP and UHP. It should also be noted
that Assumption (ii) is criticized, for instance, by Bushong et al. (2015) in footnote 3, where they
argue that this assumption can contradict relative thinking in a counter-intuitive manner.
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buying, we hold the price range constant between our treatments such that we
can rule out relative thinking as the driver of our effect.
Our third and most novel treatment (UHP) extends the jacket and calculator
puzzle by showing that not only the base price, but also the expectations of the
base price affect price sensitivity. An agent is price-sensitive even at high base
prices if she is surprised by the high price level. This treatment allows to test for
two assumptions simultaneously: for ordering and for the effect of only mentally
available items on decision making. Especially the test for the latter is novel as it
is hard to control for a subject’s consideration set outside a controlled laboratory
experiment.
We test these fundamentals in a domain where salience theory’s predictions
are most novel. Alternative predictions, such as decoy and compromise effects,
have been documented in different domains (see, e.g., Highhouse, 1996), both in
hypothetical and in incentivized experiments (Herne, 1999). For instance, Heath
and Chatterjee (1995) provide a meta-analysis which demonstrates that adding
decoys to choice sets increases the demand for brands which are similar to the
decoys but reduces demand for dissimilar brands.
7 Conclusion
This study explores choices between vertically differentiated products in a labo-
ratory experiment with real consumption decisions. We find that decision mak-
ers’ responses largely depend on whether price levels are expected or not. An
expectedly high price level induces more subjects to choose the high-quality
product than if subjects were unsure about the actual prices. By analyzing the
differential effects of expected and unexpected price hikes, we confirm two cen-
tral predictions of consumer choice for vertically differentiated products made
by salience theory (Bordalo et al., 2013). Furthermore, we review alternative es-
tablished behavioral theories and find that these theories cannot account for our
findings.
Our studyprovides interesting insights for researchers andpractitioners about
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the decision making of consumers. Given that salience theory predicts that ex-
pected upward price shifts can reduce consumers’ price sensitivity, it yields a
rationale for various observations in the retail sector. For example, our findings
explain why suppliers can sustain high margins for premium products in high-
price environments where quality ismore likely to be overweightedwhile prices
tend to be disregarded.18
Moreover, we document that consumers tend to overweight prices when
price increases are unexpected. This yields important insights for marketing
purposes. For instance, when a retailer is confrontedwith uniform cost increases
(for all its products, e.g., change in quantity taxes), the retailer should not only
expect its demand to drop if the change in final consumer prices is unexpected
by consumers, but also to expect that demand between high- and low-quality
variants will change toward lower quality.
18For instance, Dudenho¨ffer (2014) shows that premium manufacturers in the automotive in-
dustry can preserve EBIT margins for each car that are twice as high as those earned by high-
volume manufacturers.
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Appendix A: Information emails and instructions
Dear participants,
please read this email carefully! It contains information about the procedure of the experiment on
xx/xx/2015, for which you registered.
The experiment is about your willingness to pay for internet access. You have to purchase high-speed or
low-speed internet which you can use at your convenience during the experiment - please note that it is not
possible to buy no internet access at all! For participating in the experiment you will automatically receive a
fixed payment of 12 Euro minus the costs for the selected internet access.
You can use the internet at your convenience during the experiment and you do not have to do any further
tasks. Note that the browserwill be reset automatically after the experiment - no contentwill be saved! Neither
the experimenters nor other people can reproduce which websites you have visited.
Restrictions: you are not allowed to use the speakers of the computer in order to not disturb other participants,
to visit illegalwebsites or to performanydownloads. Furthermore, you are not allowed to use your ownpaper,
mobile phones or any other printed media or electronic devices.
High-speed internet (regular internet access via the HHU-network) can be described as follows:
• Frequently visited pages like facebook.de, spiegel.de or bild.de take on average less than 5 seconds
to load.
Low-speed internet (restricted internet access) can be described as follows:
• Frequently visited pages like facebook.de, spiegel.de or bild.de take on average about 30 seconds to
load.
The one-time costs for the two alternatives are:
• High-speed internet: e1.50
• Low-speed internet: e0.50
At the beginning of the experiment you will receive a decision sheet where you have to indicate your choice
for one of the two internet alternatives. After you havemade your decision, your computer is set up according
to your choice and you can use the internet for the next 45 minutes. After 45 minutes you will receive your
payment (12 Euro minus the cost for the chosen internet access) and the experiment is finished.
Figure A1: Information email for the participants of treatment LP.
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Dear participants,
please read this email carefully! It contains information about the procedure of the experiment on
xx/xx/2015, for which you registered.
The experiment is about your willingness to pay for internet access. You have to purchase high-speed or
low-speed internet which you can use at your convenience during the experiment - please note that it is not
possible to buy no internet access at all! For participating in the experiment you will automatically receive a
fixed payment of 15 Euro minus the costs for the selected internet access.
You can use the internet at your convenience during the experiment and you do not have to do any further
tasks. Note that the browserwill be reset automatically after the experiment - no contentwill be saved! Neither
the experimenters nor other people can reproduce which websites you have visited.
Restrictions: you are not allowed to use the speakers of the computer in order to not disturb other participants,
to visit illegalwebsites or to performanydownloads. Furthermore, you are not allowed to use your ownpaper,
mobile phones or any other printed media or electronic devices.
High-speed internet (regular internet access via the HHU-network) can be described as follows:
• Frequently visited pages like facebook.de, spiegel.de or bild.de take on average less than 5 seconds
to load.
Low-speed internet (restricted internet access) can be described as follows:
• Frequently visited pages like facebook.de, spiegel.de or bild.de take on average about 30 seconds to
load.
The one-time costs for the two alternatives are either:
• High-speed internet: e1.50
• Low-speed internet: e0.50
or
• High-speed internet: e4.50
• Low-speed internet: e3.50
At the beginning of the experiment you will learn which of the two price levels will apply in the experiment.
Youwill receive a decision sheetwhere you have to indicate your choice for one of the two internet alternatives.
After you have made your decision, your computer is set up according to your choice and you can use the
internet for the next 45 minutes. After 45 minutes you will receive your payment (15 Euro minus the cost for
the chosen internet access) and the experiment is finished.
Figure A2: Information email for the participants of treatment UHP.
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Information on the experiment
Welcome to this experimental study. Please do not talk to other participants fromnowon. You are not allowed
to use your own paper, mobile phones or any other printed media or electronic devices.
For the duration of the experiment (45 minutes) you have to purchase high-speed or low-speed internet
which you can use at your convenience during the experiment - please note that it is not possible to buy no
internet access at all! For participating in the experiment you will receive a fixed payment of 12 Euro minus
the costs for the selected internet alternative.
You can use the internet at your convenience during the experiment and there are no other tasks to complete.
Note that we do not store any information: the browser will reset automatically after the experiment! Neither
the experimenters nor any third party can track which websites you have visited.
High-speed internet (regular internet access via the HHU-network) can be described as follows:
• Frequently visited pages like facebook.de, spiegel.de or bild.de take on average less than 5 seconds
to load.
Low-speed internet (restricted internet access) can be described as follows:
• Frequently visited pages like facebook.de, spiegel.de or bild.de take on average about 30 seconds to
load.
After all participants read the instructions, you will receive a decision sheet where you have to indicate your
choice for one of the two alternatives.
The one-time costs for the two alternatives are:
• High-speed internet: 1.50e
• Low-speed internet: 0.50e
After you have made your decision you can use the internet for the next 45 minutes. [Restrictions: you are not
allowed to use the speakers of the computer in order to not disturb other participants, to visit illegal websites
or to perform any downloads].
After 45 minutes you will receive your payment (12 Euro minus the cost for the chosen internet access) and
the experiment ends.
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact the experimenters at any time. Just raise your hand
and we will answer your question privately.
After completing the experiment, please wait at your seat until you are called.
Figure A3: Instructions for the participants of treatment LP.
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Appendix B: Subject characteristics
Appendix C: Formal analysis of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006)
In order to investigate whether Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) can account for Result
2, we determine all personal equilibria (PE) in treatment UHP. Suppose that an
agent expects to find the low price level with some exogenous probability 0 <
pL ≤ 1 and a high price level with pH := 1 − pL. Given the low price level,
the decision maker expects to choose the low-quality option with probability pLs
and the high quality option with probability 1− pLs . Given the high price level,
she expects to opt for the low-quality option with probability pHs and for the
high-quality option with probability 1 − pHs . Then, the reference price level rp
equals
rp(pL) := pL (0.50 p
L
s + 1.50 (1− p
L
s )) + (1− pL) (3.50 p
H
s + 4.50 (1− p
H
s ))
and the reference quality level is given by
rq(pL) = qL
(
pL p
L
s + (1− pL) p
H
s
)
+ qH
(
pL (1− p
L
s ) + (1− pL) (1− p
H
s )
)
.
A PE requires the following consistency criterion to be satisfied. Given the
reference point (rp, rq), the decision maker finds it optimal to follow her plan
at the second stage, that is, if prices are low (high) she chooses the low-quality
option with probability pLs (p
H
s , respectively).
According to KR, the utility derived from an alternative k = (pk, qk), given a
reference point r = (rp, rq), is given by
u(k|r) = v(k) + n(k|r),
where n(k|r) denotes the gain-loss utility relative to the reference point (which
is zero in a rationalmodel). As before, the agent’s consumption utility v(k) is lin-
ear and equals v(k) = q−p. Suppose that the high- and the low-quality product
lie on a rational indifference curve, thus qH = qL + 1. We assume that n is ad-
ditively separable across dimensions, i.e., n((pk, qk)|r) := np(pk|rp) + nq(qk|rq),
and ni(x|y) := µ(vi(x)− vi(y)) for a function µ which satisfies the properties of
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Table B1: Subject characteristics across treatments
Treatment Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
LP Gender 0.456 0.503 0 1 57
Age 24.925 3.807 18 38 53
Undergraduate (Bachelor) 0.660 0.478 0 1 53
Humanities 0.345 0.48 0 1 55
Human medicine 0.073 0.262 0 1 55
Law 0.036 0.189 0 1 55
Mathematics and Natural Sciences 0.273 0.449 0 1 55
Economics 0.273 0.449 0 1 55
Electrical Engineering 0 0 0 0 55
HP Gender 0.492 0.504 0 1 59
Age 24.833 3.575 20 38 54
Undergraduate (Bachelor) 0.596 0.496 0 1 47
Humanities 0.333 0.476 0 1 57
Human medicine 0.123 0.331 0 1 57
Law 0.088 0.285 0 1 57
Mathematics and Natural Sciences 0.193 0.398 0 1 57
Economics 0.246 0.434 0 1 57
Electrical Engineering 0.018 0.132 0 1 57
UHP Gender 0.509 0.505 0 1 53
Age 24.234 3.198 18 32 47
Undergraduate (Bachelor) 0.558 0.502 0 1 52
Humanities 0.25 0.437 0 1 52
Human medicine 0.096 0.298 0 1 52
Law 0.038 0.194 0 1 52
Mathematics and Natural Sciences 0.308 0.466 0 1 52
Economics 0.308 0.466 0 1 52
Electrical Engineering 0 0 0 0 52
Full sample Gender 0.485 0.501 0 1 169
Age 24.681 3.538 18 38 154
Undergraduate (Bachelor) 0.605 0.490 0 1 152
Humanities 0.311 0.464 0 1 164
Human medicine 0.098 0.298 0 1 164
Law 0.055 0.228 0 1 164
Mathematics and Natural Sciences 0.256 0.438 0 1 164
Economics 0.274 0.448 0 1 164
Electrical Engineering 0.006 0.078 0 1 164
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the value function introduced in Kahneman and Tversky (1979). In particular,
let µ be a piecewise linear function which is defined by µ(x) = ηx if x > 0
and µ(x) = ηλx if x ≤ 0, where parameter η > 0 is a measure of the weight a
decision maker assigns to the gain-loss utility and λ is a coefficient of loss aver-
sion. Following prospect theory, losses relative to the reference point receive
larger weights than gains, i.e., λ > 1. As choosing the high quality will never
represent a loss in the quality dimension we have
nq(qH |rq) = η (qH − rq).
Analogously, the low quality will never represent a gain, that is
nq(qL|rq) = λη(qL − rq).
Concerning prices, the low quality product’s price will never represent a loss at
the low price level and the high quality product’s price will never represent a
gain at the high price level.
In the following we discuss the case where subjects expect both scenarios
with equal probability, that is, pL = 50%. We then show that the only PE involves
choosing the low-quality product with probability 1.19
First, if there is a solution with 0 < pHs < 1, then the decision maker is
indifferent between opting for the high and the low quality at the second stage
at high prices, that is,
qL − 3.50− np(3.50|rp(pL))− λη(rq(pL)− qL)
=qH − 4.50− λη(4.50− rp(pL)) + η(qH − rq(pL))
19Straightforward computations show that this pure strategy equilibrium exists also for arbi-
trary expectations of pL. If pL becomes sufficiently small such that the low quality option at the
high price level can be perceived as a gain in the monetary dimension for some pHs and p
L
s , then,
however, multiple equilibria exist. In that case, it is also an equilibrium to have pHs = 0 and in
addition there exists also a strictly mixed equilibrium such that any choice pattern can be in line
with KR.
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or, with our specification,
qL − 3.5− ηλ(3.5− rp(0.5))− λη(rq(0.5)− qL)
=qH − 4.5− ηλ(4.5− rp(0.5)) + η(qH − rq(0.5)).
As qH = qL + 1, this is equivalent to rq = qH , which is a contradiction as we
assumed pHs > 0. Thus, it must hold that p
H
s ∈ {0, 1}.
Second, suppose pHs = 1. Then, it has to be (weakly) optimal to choose the
high quality at the second stage, that is
qL− 3.50− ηλ(3.50− rp)− ηλ(rq − qL) ≤ qH − 4.50− ηλ(4.50− rp) + η(qH − rq)
or, equivalently,
λ(qH − rq) ≤ qH − rq,
which is a contradiction as λ > 1 and qH > rq.
Third, suppose pHs = 0 such that
qL− 3.50− ηλ(3.50− rp)− ηλ(qL− rq) ≥ qH − 4.50− ηλ(4.50− rp) + η(qH − rq)
has to be fulfilled. Indeed, the equivalent condition
λ(rq + 1− qL) > (qH − rq),
is satisfied as the reference quality is closer to qL than to qH and in particular
rq + 1 − qL > qH − qL and qH − rq < qH − qL. Thus, in a personal equilibrium
the decision maker will rationally expect to choose the low quality in order to
minimize her loss in the price-domain.
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